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It may fairly be inferred from that language, and from the
statements of the earlier cases set forth above, that subject
to the limitation of the plain meaning rule our Court of
Appeals would consider committee hearings and reports
and legislative debate if those materials existed in obtainable form.
However, under present legislative practice in Maryland, the only method, aside from the words of the statute
itself, of indicating legislative intention is by use of a
preamble.2 7 A substantial factor in the determination of
statutory meaning is, therefore, unavailable. It therefore
seems proper to suggest that the Legislative Council consider the feasibility of modernizing the antiquated Maryland system by providing for the reporting and printing
of legislative hearings, reports and debates.2 8 If it be
argued that the result is not worth the additional expense
involved, it may be answered that that argument is equally
applicable to the printing of the statutes themselves, for
in present legal theory legislative history is as much a part
of the construction of a statute as is the language of the
act itself. Yet, clearly, no one would regard such an argument as tenable.
APPEAL FROM STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
COMMISSION BY NON-APPEARING PARTY
Hathcock, et al., v. Loften1
Oxford Cabinet Co. v. Parks2
Two cases, decided on the same day by the Court of
Appeals, deal with the right of appeal from the State Industrial Accident Commission to the courts of record. In
the first case, after the claimants had -filed their petition
before the Commission, the employer applied for a hear2, See, e. g., Md. Laws 1933 Sp., Ch. 104, in the preamble of which the
General Assembly indicated its intention to reverse the holding of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The most common form of preamble is
the "whereas" clause of most repealing statutes, e. g., Md. Laws 1941, Ch.
691. See also the recent case of Shell Oil Co. v. Brownley, Baltimore
Daily Record, June 26, 1942 (Md., 1942), the opinion in which relies, in
part, on the preamble to the statute.
28 Consideration might also well be given to the removal by statute of

the limitation of the plain meaning rule. The anomalies of that rule are
well presented in Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsio Aids in the
Interpretationof Federal Statutes (1939) 25 Wash. U. L. Q. 2; Note (1937)
50 Harv. L. Rev. 822.
122 A.
A. (2d)
(2d) 481
479 (Md.,
(Md., 1942).
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ing, specifying five questions for inquiry.3 The claimants
failed to appear at the hearing, and ten days later the
Commission passed an order disallowing their claim. The
claimants appealed to the Baltimore City Court on the
theory that their application before the Commission constituted prima facie proof of their claim, and that they
were therefore entitled to an appeal with the privilege
of adducing any other testimony in support of their petition. The Court of Appeals sustained the lower Court
in dismissing the appeal, and thereby precluded a nonappearing claimant party before the Commission from the
opportunity of giving proof to sustain 4 his claim for the
first time on appeal to the lower court.
In the second case, a claim was filed before the Commission and notice thereof was sent to the employer. The
employer failed either to request a hearing or to appear
before the Commission, and subsequently, on proof offered
by the claimant, an order was passed allowing compensation. From this order, the employer appealed to the Baltimore City Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the
order of the lower court in dismissing the appeal, and
thereby allowed the non-appearing defendant party the
opportunity to prove his defense for the first time on the
appeal from the Commission.
The seeming inconsistency of the two cases is reconciled
by the Court of Appeals on the ground that in the Hathcock
case a hearing was requested, which was not true in the
Parks case, and that therefore proof in addition to the
claim was necessary for the Commission to pass an order
for compensation in the former case, but was not necessary
in the latter. The fact remains, however, that under the
two decisions,, a non-appearing defendant may offer proof
for the first time on his appeal to the law court to preclude
recovery, but a non-appearing claimant may not offer such
proof to obtain recovery on his appeal from the Commission to the lower court.
The instant cases, taken together, suggest the problem
of the method of appeal from the State Industrial Accident
aThe questions included jurisdiction of the Commission, the inclusion
of the injury and death under the compensation law, the dependency of
claimants, and the amount of wages paid the deceased.
4 The Court said that in the absence of any application for a hearing
the Coinmission might find the material submitted to it sufficient for a
decision. But in this case it was doubtful whether this would be possible.
By the defendant's request for a hearing, the Court reasoned that the
claim was in controversy, and the claimants were put to their proof. If
no proof was offered to support the claim, the court said the ground of
appeal in the commission's determination of the facts was lacking.
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Commission, primarily with reference to the extent to
which the record before the Commission becomes the basis
for appellate determination as to facts contained therein.
Generally speaking, court review of fact findings of administrative bodies may be classified into three categories according to the extent of review made by the court. They
might be designated as the law method, the equity method,
and the justice of the peace method.5 Under the law
method, the review is on the record as made by the Commission and the court must affirm the Commission's finding if there is substantial evidence to support it. Under
the equity method, the record as made before the Commission is still the basis for appeal (that is, the court accepts
no new evidence), but the court may weigh the evidence
as it appears in the record and substitute its judgment for
that of the Commission as to the findings of fact. Under
the justice of the peace method, there is a complete trial
de novo on appeal and the record comes in only, if at all,
as evidence of the material contained therein, supplementing the other evidence which may be received for the first
time on appeal. From the point of view of effective administration, the law method is deemed to be the most
satisfactory form of fact review.
In Maryland, as is usual, appeals from the State Industrial Accident Commission are governed by statute.6 This7
section of the Code has been amended from time to time,
and the result has been that at different periods during the
history of the Commission provision has been made for
modified versions of two of the above suggested methods:
the equity method and the justice of the peace method of
appeal. A grouping of these periods will show that from
1914 to 1931 the justice of the peace method of appeal was
utilized,' but from 1931 to 1935, the equity method was
used.9 In 1935 however the statute was again changed
and the 1914-1931 method was re-enacted. 10 For the purposes of the instant note, these methods of appeal will be
5For a similar classification, under different names, and more thoroughly justified, see Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact" (1941)
15 Temple L. Q. 185, 199.
6 Md. Code (1939) Art. 101, Sec. 70.
During its history, Art. 101, See. 70, has been repealed and re-enacted
five times.
8 Md. Laws 1914, Ch. 800, Sec. 56 continued in force until repealed by
Md. Laws 1931, Ch. 406.
9 Md. Laws 1931, Ch. 406 continued in force until repealed by Md. Laws
1935, Ch. 545.
0
" Md. Laws 1935, Ch. 545.
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discussed in the following order; viz., first the equity, and
second the justice of the peace method.
In 1931, the existing statute governing appeals from the
Commission was repealed, and in its place was substituted
a provision which called for an appeal "from the record
made before the Commission". 1 The result was that the
existing method of appeal was discarded and its place was
taken by the equity procedure. In general, appeals were
limited to the facts and testimony appearing on the record
before the Commission.12 It was impossible, therefore,
after an appeal had been taken, to send the record back to
the Commission for additional evidence. 13 It was as
equally impossible, after an appeal had been taken, to send
the record back to the Commission to secure a different
ruling by the board on additional evidence that might be
taken. 4 However, the court was not required before hearing an appeal from the Commission to adopt and declare
issues of fact, when such appeal was without a jury. 5 And
it was well settled, that although review was confined to
the record made before the Commission, this did not preclude the court from rejecting any extremely prejudicial
evidence found in the record when a jury was resorted to
for a decision on the facts.' 6 On the other hand, a party
who failed to object to the admission of evidence before
the Commission was precluded from initially objecting
thereto on appeal to the law court.'"
The method of appeal from 1931 to 1935 was, therefore,
a clear cut example of the equity procedure. If a reversal
was to be obtained, the mistake had to appear from the
record. It was impossible to secure additional evidence
on appeal, or in any way to have a trial de novo. However,
this procedure is of little more than academic interest
today. The reason is that the present appeal statute repealed the equity method, and substituted in its place the
21 Supra, n. 9.

1 Thomas v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 162 Md. 509, 160 A. 793 (1932);
Celanese Corp. v. Lease, 162 Md. 587, 160 A, 801 (1932) ; Sinsko v. Weiskettel and Sons, 163 Md. 614, 163 A. 693 (1932) ; Federal Tin Co. v. Hoffman, 164 Md. 431, 165 A. 323 (1933); Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49,
161 A. 276 (1932).
13 Monumental Printing Co. v. Edell, 163 Md. 551, 164 A. 171 (1932).
14 Ibid. Although this question was not squarely before the Court, it
was envisioned as a possibility in later litigation and was therefore answered by the court.
15 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 164 Md. 117, 164 A. 179 (1932).
10 Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1932).
,Federal Tin Co. v. Hoffman, 164 Md. 431, 165 A. 323 (1933).
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original procedure under the act, i. e., the justice of the
peace method.18
The present day appeal from the State Industrial Accident Commission to the law court may be described generally as an appeal de novo.'9 A long line of cases may
be cited to support this statement."° Before the Act was
two years old, the question was squarely placed before
the court of whether additional witnesses could be called
and new and additional evidence taken on appeal. The
court answered the question in the affirmative, and stated
that the legislature intended to secure to the appellant in
such cases all the benefits of the Constitutional guaranties
of a jury trial in civil proceedings. 2' As a result, a witness
may be called to testify on appeal even although he has
testified before the Commission.2 2 If the party so desires,
testimony of a witness may be placed before the jury on
appeal through the medium of the record, even though the
witness is within the jurisdiction of the Court, and therefore could have been called to testify on appeal in person.2 3
Where the testimony of a witness taken before the Commission is read to the jury, however, it is error to allow
the same witness to repeat that testimony in person.2 4
Cases have suggested that if a party takes a jury appeal
the procedure will be in the nature of a trial de novo, but
if the party takes a non-jury appeal, the case may be preCommission. In
sented upon the record taken before the
25
Harvey v. Roche & Son, the Court said:
"Concerning proceeding on appeal, there is no requirement that the transcript of testimony taken before the Commission shall be read to the jury; there is
18 Md. Laws 1935, Ch. 545.

"This exact language is not used in the statute, but it is submitted
that the construction which it has received leads inevitably to this result.
20 See Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 96 A. 764 (1916) ; Savage Mfg. Co.
v. Magne, 154 Md. 46, 139 A. 570 (1927) ; Glass Equipment Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md.
249, 127 A. 850 (1925) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 'Md. 116, 148
A. 246 (1929) ; Harvey v. Roche and Son, 148 Md. 363, 129 A. 359 (1925) ;
Baltimore v. Perticone, 171 Md. 268, 188 A. 797 (1937) ; Spence v. Steel
Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1937) ; Coal Co. v. Balchumas, 174 Md. 453,
199 A. 534 (1938).
21 Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 96 A. 764 (1916).
2
' Ibid; Harvey v. Roche and Sons, 148 Md. 363, 129 A. 359 (1925).
22 Savage Mfg. Co. v. Magne, 154 Md. 46, 139 A. 570 (1927).
21 Harvey v. Roche and Sons, 148 Md. 366, 129 A. 359 (1925).
21 Ibid. It is to be observed that the language quoted indicates that the
non-jury appeal "may be . . . upon proceedings taken before the Commission." This leaves room for speculation as to whether in such case it
mu-st be reviewed upon the record alone.
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no mention of that testimony. The Act evidently contemplates that the case may be presented to the Court,
without a jury, upon proceedings taken before the
Commission. But nothing in it requires that the record of those proceedings and that testimony be submitted to the jury when a jury trial is had on its facts.
The jury trial provided for would seem to be, not a
review of the decision of the Commission, but an original trial on the question of fact submitted, in which
the evidence is to be presented as in any other trial."
In an appeal from the Commission, there is no objection
to a party presenting part of his case through the medium
of the transcript taken before the Commission and partly
by calling additional witnesses. 6 Moreover, objections to
questions asked before the Commission may be made for
the first time on appeal.2 7 Rules of evidence, however, are
affected to some degree because the law court is sitting in
an appellate capacity from the Commission. It has been
held in such cases that the law court may adapt itself somewhat to the increased latitude allowed to the Commission
28
in admitting evidence open to technical legal objections.
This does not mean, however, that the rules of evidence
are to be abandoned in the law court. If testimony is
although
clearly prejudicial, it may be excluded on appeal
29
it had been admitted before the Commission.
The result of this investigation is that, in general, the
appeal from the State Industrial Accident Commission to
the law court is in the nature of a trial de novo. And it is
upon this background that both the Hathcock case and the
Parks case should be examined. If the technical rules of
a trial de novo are applied, it would seem that the Hathcock case, in refusing to allow the claimant to make his
proof for the first time in the law court, is inconsistent
with those rules and the cases that support them. At the
same time, it would seem that the Parks case, in allowing
the defendant to make proof of his defense for the first
time in the law court, is consistent with the principles of a
trial de novo.
A more expeditious way of viewing the problem, however, is to say that while the Parks case is consistent with
the ordinary concepts of a trial de novo, the Hathcock case
Baltimore v. Perticone, 171 Md. 268, 188 A. 797 (1937).
Spence v. Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1937) ; Coal Co. v. Balchumas, 174 Md. 453, 199 A. 534 (1938).
28 Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925).
29
Ibid. Gas Equipment Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927).
28
27
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engrafts upon those concepts a socially desirable exception.
That it is undoubtedly true that a party should not be allowed to disregard the Commission, and place his case
for the first time before the law court cannot be doubted.
Such a procedure would negative the reason for the existence of the Commission. Parties should be required
to submit all of their available evidence in the first instance to the Administrative Board which has been created for the purpose of hearing such evidence. The Board
is thereby given an opportunity to function on the case
before the party appeals for a determination as to whether
it has decided the issues correctly, a procedure which
would be consistent with the general intendment of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. In other jurisdictions the
findings of Industrial Accident Commissions are given the
same weight as that accorded to the verdict of a jury or the
findings of a trial court 0 A provision for a trial de novo
from such Commissions is therefore not the generally accepted rule. Any decision that reduces the broad scope of
the Maryland rule, and vests in the Commission more
power to function as an ordinary administrative board is
desirable. It is believed that the Hathcock case produces
in part the result to be obtained.
CONSOLIDATION OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS
Stone, et al., v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.)'
Tip Top Tailors, Inc., a Delaware corporation, owned
and operated eight retail stores for the purpose of conducting its made-to-measure clothing business in Georgia,
New York, Ohio, Michigan, and the District of Columbia.
The business was carried on in the following manner: Customers would order from samples kept in the local stores
and the orders would be sent to the main office of the corporation which was located in Newark, New Jersey. The
garment would be made up according to specification, sent
to the store from which the order came and delivered to
the customer.
30

Comment, Review of Facts Found by Industrial Commissin#a (1938)
14 Corn. L. Q. 250-251.
1127 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), petition for rehearing denied, 128
F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).

